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An example is presented of a two-country, two-factor, four-good trade model in which free trade 
causes factor prices to be drawn farther apart than they were in autarky. The example is 
equivalent to a two-good model with a double factor intensity reversal (FIR), and thus 
demonstrates that the problems associated with FIRs can arise in many dimensions without 
them. These problems include the undermining of other trade theorems as well, and can be 
avoided only by making some assumption about demand as well as about technology. For 
example, the model becomes well-behaved if preferences and technology are both Cobb-- 
Douglas. 
1. Introduction 
It  is well k n o w n  tha t  fac tor  intensi ty  reversals (FIRs)  can p lay  havoc  with 
the theorems  of  the H e c k s c h e r - O h l i n - S a m u e l s o n  (HOS)  mode l  of  inter-  
na t iona l  t rade.  I t  is therefore cus tomary  to exclude F I R s  by  assumpt ion ,  with 
or  wi thou t  a sol id  empir ica l  basis  for do ing  so. 1 The  s t anda rd  2 x 2 x 2 H O S  
mode l  then per forms  nicely. Whi le  o ther  difficulties have somet imes  ar isen in 
efforts to extend theorems  to higher  d imensions ,  some success has been 
achieved,  as surveyed by Eth ier  (1984). However ,  I wou ld  suggest  tha t  fur ther  
extensions will be difficult, a t  least  unti l  we come to terms with  the p rob lems  
posed  in two d imens ions  by FIRs .  F o r  the same kinds of p rob l ems  also arise 
in m a n y  d imensions ,  even when F I R s  themselves are  absent .  The  p rob l e m is 
tha t  cer ta in  proper t ies  of  preferences a m o n g  m a n y  goods  can repl icate  
a rb i t ra r i ly  closely the effects of FIRs .  Thus,  until  we can find an acceptab le  
*This paper is based on Deardorff (1983), a short paper which failed to generate the interest I 
thought it deserved. In the spirit of the Washington bureaucracy, I have responded to the failure 
of that paper by making it larger and changing its name. I would like to thank Ted Bergstrom, 
Jon Eaton, Bob Stern and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments, as well as other 
members of the Research Seminar in International Economics at Michigan and those who 
participated in the trade theory conference at the University of Western Ontario, 17 March, 
1984. Support in writing this paper was provided by the Ford Foundation. 
~Minhas (1962) claimed to have identified enough empirically relevant FIRs to make the HOS 
model questionable. His methodology was criticized by a number of authors, surveyed by 
Bhagwati (1969), but Stern (1975) noted more recent work that leaves the empirical importance 
of FIRs still up in the air. 
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regularity assumption that applies simultaneously to both technology and 
preferences, our efforts to characterize behavior in a many dimensional HOS 
model will be of only limited success. 
The basis for these concerns consists of an example in section 2. Free trade 
in four goods between two countries with two factors can cause factor prices 
to move farther apart than in autarky. This occurs without FIRs, but for 
reasons best understood by looking first at a two-good model with a double 
FIR. The factor-price equalization theorem is violated in the extreme in this 
example, since there is not even a tendency toward factor prices being 
equalized. This is not a complete novelty, since Land (1959), with an assist 
by Stewart (1976), has also shown such an example. But in rriy example, 
unlike Land's, factor prices move apart in opposite directions, providing a 
more dramatic and easily understood picture of their effects. 
These effects are discussed further in section 3, where I examine major 
propositions of pure trade theory. While some of these have been extended in 
various forms to higher dimensions, I argue that the intuition behind them 
all is undermined in this example. Thus, the example represents more than 
just a curious possibility. It goes to the heart of the economic intuition that 
has underlain trade theory since Heckscher (1919) and Ohlin (1933). 
Their insight, as I understand it, was that factor prices are determined by 
factor scarcity, and that trade, by opening factor markets to indirect 
competition with factors abroad, alters this relative scarcity. Thus, a 
country's scarce factor is relatively expensive in autarky, earning the usual 
scarcity rent. With trade, however, the products produced by that scarce 
factor must compete with counterparts produced by the same factor abroad, 
where it is relatively more abundant. This trade erodes the scarcity rent of 
the factor, causing its originally high relative return to fall. Similarly, a 
country's relatively abundant factor will have its relatively low autarky price 
raised by trade, as it finds new markets for what it can best produce. Thus, 
the tendency for factor prices to converge with trade is a straightforward 
implication of supply and demand, and has nothing to do with the particular 
mathematical properties of homogeneous production functions that seem, 
almost coincidentally, to give rise in special cases to full factor-price 
equalization. 
Given this strong economic reason for 
do they fail to do so in my example? The 
face competition, indirectly through the 
factor prices to converge, why then 
reason is that factors of production 
goods they produce, not just with 
identical goods producible with identical factors abroad. Instead, in a world 
of many goods, complex relationships in demand matter as well. Specifically, 
in my example a scarce factor competes through trade with goods produced 
abroad that are not identical to what it produces at home, but are only close 
substitutes. If these close substitutes happen to be relatively expensive 
abroad, compared with other goods produced there, then the domestic scarce 
A. E Deardorff, Theorems of international trade 133 
factor may win this competition in spite of its own scarcity. Likewise, if 
competition through close substitutes pits a domestic abundant factor against 
other products that are relatively cheap abroad, then its relative return may 
fall. Since this competition is with different goods whose factor intensities are 
unrelated to those used at home, knowledge of relative scarcity and 
abundance of factors alone is not enough to determine how this competition 
will work itself out. 
The particular example below focuses on goods that are close substitutes, 
but extremes of complementarity in demand no doubt could also lead to 
similar results. The point is that once one moves beyond the simplicity of a 
two-good model where interesting patterns of substitutability and com- 
plementarity cannot arise, the issue of how factors compete with one another 
through international trade depends crucially on these aspects of demand. 
One result of this is that even the tendency toward factor-price equalization 
is not assured in a general many-good model. This in turn, as I will show in 
section 3, causes other aspects of economic performance, such as trade itself 
and real factor incomes, to depart from what one would have expected on 
the basis of the simple HOS model. 
Another implication of these results is that existence or nonexistence of 
FIRs is not the issue. To clinch this point I show in section 4 that one can 
turn any model with FIRs into one without, and vice versa, simply by 
redefining goods. FIRs are meaningful only in the textbook two-good model, 
where the limited number of goods constrains the relationships that can exist 
among them. For a many-good model to be well behaved we need some 
other assumption about preferences, together with technology. 
What assumption should this be? I do not know, and I hope others will be 
induced to look for one by my example. All I offer now is an assumption 
that is far too extreme: that all utility and production functions are Cobb- 
Douglas. In section 5 I show that this assumption guarantees factor-price 
convergence. Thus my example and its disturbing implications cannot occur 
in such a Cobb-Douglas world. 
2. The example 
Because Samuelson's (1949) factor-price equalization theorem requires very 
restrictive assumptions, it would be useful to have a weaker but more 
generally valid result, such as that factor prices are drawn closer !ogether by 
trade. 2 Unfortunately, Land (1959) has shown that this need not be the 
case? Here, I provide a more dramatic example of factor-price divergence 
2This was Ohlin's (1933) proposition, which Samuelson (1971) argues is correct in a specific- 
factors model. 
aJohnson (1967) objected that Land's counterexample was inconsistent with equilibrium in all 
markets. Stewart (1976), however, showed how demands could respond to price differences so as 
to validate Land's example. 
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that is simpler and more useful for my later analysis. ¢ In my example, the 
structure of preferences for four goods leads to behavior like a two-good 
model with a double FIR, in which factor prices may move apart in opposite 
directions with trade. 
First consider the familiar two-good HOS model with two FIRs. The 
relationship between relative factor prices, ~o, and the relative price of two 
goods, P = P t / P . ,  is S-shaped as in fig. 1. 5 If factor endowments of two 
countries, A and B, differ appropriately, then autarky factor prices may be 
co A and co n, as shown. As drawn, the relative autarky price of good I is 
higher in A, even though good I is locally labor-intensive in both countries 
and A is abundantly endowed with labor. 6 Thus, with trade, as prices of 
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Now consider a different model, with no FIRs but four goods, whose unit 
isoquants are those in fig. 2. Suppose the following very special preferences: 
goods X~ and X 3 are perfect substitutes, as are goods X 2 and X¢. With this 
"~In the Land-Stewart counterexample, free trade can lower the wage-rental ratio in both 
countries, and the fall can be greater where the ratio was initially lower. Comparing these 
changes may be sensitive to units of measurement. Dixit and Norman (1980, p. 102) mention the 
difficulty of measuring distance between vectors of factor prices. This difficulty is avoided when 
factor-price ratios move apart in opposite directions. 
SSee Samuelson (1949) for this relation without FIRs. See Chacholiades (1978, pp. 273-280) 
and the references cited therein for cases of single and multiple FIRs. 
6Relative factor intensities determinine the slope of the curve, since a rise in the relative wage 
raises the relative price of the labor-intensive good. Thus in fig. I, good I is labor intensive for 
both high and low wage-rental ratios, but capital intensive in between. Relative factor 
abundance can be measured either by relative autarky factor prices or by relative physical 
endowments. In this case the two definitions agree. 
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assumption the two pairs of goods can be aggregated, and the model is 
equivalent to a model with only two goods. 
The feasible inputs for a unit of the X1-X3 aggregate include all convex 
combinations of inputs for producing one unit of Xx and one unit of X3, 
thus the convex hull of the separate X~ and X3 isoquants: the curve abcd. 
Similarly, the unit isoquant for the X2-X4 aggregate is the curve a'b'c'd'. 
These two aggregate unit isoquants intersect three times, displaying two 
FIRs, just as in fig. 1. Thus, the four-good model with these particular 
pairwise perfect substitutes will behave exactly like the two-good model with 
a double FIR, and factor prices may diverge with trade, as in fig. 1. 
What can happen, more fully, is this. v Since prices of perfect substitutes 
must be the same, let p1=pa=p~ and p2=p4=pu, and call goods XI and X 3 
type I, goods X 2 and X4 type II. In autarky, if country A is sufficiently labor 
abundant, it will satisfy demands for the two types of goods by producing 
only X~ and X 2, while with enough more capital country B will produce 
only X a and X 4. Furthermore, if A's and B's endowments are sufficiently 
close to the factor requirements of X2 and X 3, respectively, then the price of 
type I goods relative to type II goods, p~/p. in fig. 1, will be higher in A than 
in B. 
When trade is opened up, demanders in A find it cheaper to import Xa 
from B than to buy X~ domestically. Likewise, demanders in B import X2 
from A to replace domestic production of X4. Thus, A exports X2 in 
exchange for Xa from B, and the relative price p~/p., falls in A and rises in B. 
7The following discussion can be illustrated with an elaboration of Samuelson's diagram 
relating relative prices of goods and factors to factor intensities. Space does not permit, including 
that diagram here, but it is available on request. 
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Since X 2 is more capital intensive than X1, the fall in p~/pn=pl/p2 in A and 
the shift of production toward X2 causes the wage--rental ratio there to fall, 
while the opposite happens in B. 
As resources shift toward the exports of the two countries, output of both 
X1 (in A) and X4 (in B) will fall, and one or both of the countries may 
completely specialize. If this happens in a country, relative factor prices there 
stop adjusting, but this does not interfere with them having been driven 
farther apart by trade) 
This particular example is made tractable by having goods be perfect 
substitutes, but a similar result could occur if they were only very close 
substitutes. What seems to be important is the asymmetry in substitution, 
goods being closer substitutes for some goods than for others, and the way 
this asymmetry interacts with factor intensities? 
3. Implications for other theorems of trade 
Implicit in the example of section 2 are several disturbing implications for 
theorems of the HOS model, besides the factor-price equalization theorem 
itself. 
3.1. The Heckscher-Ohlin theorem 
One might expect the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem to collapse in this 
example, but instead, general versions of the theorem are still valid. In 
Deardorff (1982) I proved two such versions - one for the factor content of 
trade, the other for its commodity composition - by defining factor content 
and intensity using country-of-origin production techniques. In the example 
here, country A exports X 2 and B exports X3, other goods not being traded 
at all. Each country thus exports a good that is more intensive in the use of 
its abundant factor than what it imports, and this satisfies the theorem. 
However, the example does point out the limited usefulness of the theorem 
in this form, since it fails to tell what trade will be, starting from autarky. 
Each country produces only two goods in autarky, and either one could be 
exported and the other displaced by imports. 
Since imports displace production not only of goods identical to them- 
selves, but also of goods that are close substitutes in demand, a theorem 
cannot tell us how industries will be affected by trade without first 
considering properties of demand. 
8Complete specialization here is made more likely by the endowments of the two countries 
being somewhat closer together, since this drives apart their autarky price ratios, pjpn. 
9The example is consistent with the familiar assumption of internationally identical, homothe- 
tic preferences. 
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3.2. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem 
At one level, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem is a technical and local 
relationship between prices of goods and factors, and its validity in a two- 
factor model depends mainly on whether goods are produced. Generaliza- 
tions of Stopler-Samuelson, surveyed in Ethier (1984), mostly look for 
similar local relationships. 
At a more intuitive level, however, the theorem says simply that free trade 
lowers the real wage of the scarce factor, and raises the real wage of the 
abundant factor, compared to autarky. Since free trade opens factor markets 
to indirect competition from abroad, the idea that it should cause a lessening 
of scarcity rents has great appeal. This suggests a more useful generalization 
of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem in terms of, say, a negative correlation 
between changes in factor returns and a measure of their relative scarcity. 
Unfortunately, even this weak relationship does not hold generally, since it 
fails in the example here. As long as two goods are produced in a country, 
real returns still follow relative returns, 09. Since relative returns move apart 
with trade, so do real returns, and thus real returns to scarce factors rise and 
real returns to abundant factors fall with trade. The reason is again that 
factors compete not with identical factors abroad, but rather with whatever 
factors produce the closest substitutes for what they produce at home. 
3.3. The Rybczynski theorem 
Like its dual, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, the Rybczynski theorem 
could have both local and global versions. The global version would be that 
further accumulation of a country's already abundant factor will worsen its 
terms of trade, while accumulation of its scarce factor will improve it. This is 
what happens in the 2 x 2 model with no FIRs if both goods are normal in 
consumption and both are produced, and it seems plausible that the same 
would happen in higher dimensions. If countries trade embodied factor 
services, it is natural to think of accumulation of the scarce factor, say, as 
reducing the demand for imports of its services and thus lowering their price. 
Unfortunately, once again, my example indicates that this is not generally 
true. If country A produces both X1 and X2 with free trade, then a greater 
endowment of labor will increase its output of XI and reduce its output of 
the less labor-intensive X 2. Since A exports X2, this change is therefore ultra- 
biased against exports and will improve the terms of trade. 1° Analogously, 
accumulation of A's scarce factor, capital, will worsen its terms of trade. 
How can accumulation of the abundant factor fail to worsen the terms of 
trade? It is not that such accumulation fails to cheapen the factor itself. 
Instead, what is happening is a consequence of the unusual pattern of trade. 
While A's exports are more labor intensive than her actual imports, they are 
t°SeeCorden (1956). 
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not more labor intensive than her import substitutes. When A accumulates 
labor, production of import substitutes expands and production for export 
declines, leading to an improvement in the terms of trade. 
3.4. The Mundell theorem 
A final result to consider is Mundelrs (1957) result that trade substitutes 
for international factor mobility. In the 2 × 2 model, in addition to equalizing 
factor prices, greater trade also reduces the movement of factors, while 
greater factor movement reduces the volume of trade. 
In my example here these results are overturned. Trade moves relative and 
absolute factor prices farther apart than in autarky and thus increases the 
incentive for international factor movement. Also, within limits, some inter- 
national movement of factors increases the volume of trade. Start from free 
trade with A producing X1 and X2 and exporting X2. If a small amount  of 
labor moves from the low-wage A to high-wage B, at initial prices A's 
outputs of XI will fall and of X2 will rise, tending to increase trade. After 
adjustment of prices to restore equilibrium, it is likely that the new 
equilibrium will involve larger quantities of X2 and Xa being exchanged. 
4. Do FIRs really matter? 
In spite of the importance attached to them in the textbook HOS model, 
the absence of FIRs is neither necessary nor sufficient for the validity of the 
theorems of trade in higher dimensions. 11 To emphasize this point I now 
note that FIRs can be made to appear and disappear at will, just by 
redefining goods. Thus, FIRs seem to be harmless little beasts in general, 
and, ff they appear, are mere figments of our aggregation. 12 
Suppose first that a FIR exists in the technologies of goods X and Y, 
occurring at capital-labor ratio ko, and suppose that at or near k o good X 
has the larger elasticity of substitution. 13 Redefine X as two different goods 
depending on whether it is produced with more or less capital per worker 
than ko. 14 Letting these two goods be perfect substitutes in demand, we now 
have an exactly equivalent model with no FIRs. is 
l tThat it is not sufficient follows from my example. That it is not necessary is well known 
even in two dimensions. 
12For another example of this, see Jones (1974), where a model of many traded goods and one 
nontraded good without FIRs becomes a two-good model with one FIR when the traded goods 
are aggregated. 
13Goods cannot have the same elasticity of substitution over an interval and still have a FIR 
within that interval. 
~'tLet X produced with k~_ko be X' and X produced with k<ko be X". The X' and X" 
isoquants are portions of the original X isoquant, supplemented with horizontal or vertical 
segments beginning at ko. 
tSAlternatively, con~ert each good to a continuum of goods, each using a different and fixed 
technique of production chosen from the original isoquants. 
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By a similar procedure, FIRs can be created by redefining goods. Take any 
good, X, with a conventional curved isoquant. Pick two arbitrary capital- 
labor ratios, kl and k2, and define two different goods depending on whether 
they use the factors in a ratio that is between these or not. That is, define X 
as X' for k ~ Ekl, k2] and as X "  otherwise. The X' isoquant will be vertical or 
horizontal outside this interval, while the X "  isoquant will have a downward- 
sloping straight segment within it. With X' and X" perfect substitutes, these 
constructed portions of their isoquants will never be used, and the new 
model will behave exactly like the old model. Yet these two newly defined 
goods do display a FIR. ~6 
Thus, if the definition of a 'good' is flexible, 17 the concept of a FIR should 
not play a compelling role in trade theory. The qualifications imposed by 
FIRs on the theorems of trade are appropriate however, as section 3 makes 
clear. Unless further analysis suggests an acceptable alternative assumption 
to the absence of FIRs - one that will get rid of the problems they cause 
even with many goods - we should take these problems seriously. In fact, I 
would suggest that FIRs be given increased attention in teaching, since they 
conveniently illustrate in two dimensions the problems posed by complemen- 
tarities and substitutabilities in higher dimensions. 
5. An alternative to the absence of  FIRs? 
If the absence of FIRs is neither necessary nor sufficient for trade in many 
dimensions to be well behaved, what alternative assumption might serve the 
purpose better? Traditionally, extensions of trade theorems have relied on 
factor-price equalization and incomplete specialization, which in turn require 
countries to have sufficiently similar endowments. Like Krueger (1977), I find 
these assumptions to be overly restrictive as descriptions of the world, and 
they rule out cases I find most interesting. Allowing specialization instead, 
the problems of section 3 need to be dealt with on their own terms. My 
example suggests that problems arise when goods are closer substitutes for 
some goods than for others, and I expect similar problems with analogous 
variations in complementarity. 18 To rule these out completely is too restric- 
tive, but may help to start the search for a more empirically acceptable 
assumption. 
Consider, then, a model with two countries, two factors, and any number 
of goods, n. Let all utility and production functions be Cobb-Douglas and 
~rAgain we could achieve the result with a continuum of goods. Turn just one of two goods 
into a continuum of goods with fixed techniques, as in the preceding footnote. Each of the new 
goods displays a FIR relative to the other original good. 
t TRedefining goods would be unacceptable if a particular definition of a 'good' were 
universally accepted, but this is hardly the case. Nor is differentiating goods on the basis of how 
they are produced unusual, since this is a common feature of industrial classification systems. 
tSlt was complementarities that provided the 'weak link in the chain of comparative 
advantage' in Deardorff (1979). 
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identical across countries. 19 All elasticities of substitution are then unity, and 
thus such extremes of substitutability as were assumed in section 2 are ruled 
out. In this Cobb-Douglas world, factor prices must be drawn together by 
free trade, even when they are not completely equalized. 
To see this, note first that Cobb-Douglas preferences and production 
functions together imply indirect Cobb-Douglas preferences for factors. That 
is, if consumers spend a fraction b~ on good i, and if the labor share in 
producing good i is a t, then the fraction of consumer expenditure that is paid 
to labor producing good i is c~=a~bi. Also, for any n ' < n ,  the fraction of 
expenditure on the subset of goods 1 . . . . .  n' is constant, as is the fraction O(n') 
of that that goes in turn to labor, 
O(n') = c~ bi. (1) 
i=1 i 
The wage-rental ratio of a country in autarky, ajao, j = A, B, can be derived by 
comparing shares of labor and capital, to yield: 
w i O(n) K j j o 
(D O = . - T  - -  rio 1 -- O(n) L j '  j = A, B, (2) 
where K J and L j are the respective capital and labor endowments. 
With free trade and unequal factor prices, labor-abundant A will produce 
only goods more labor intensive than those produced in B. 2° Ranking the 
goods by labor intensity, 
al > a 2 > " "  >a. ,  (3) 
one can again compare capital and labor shares to derive 
w A O(i') K A 
(DA = _ _  = (4) 
r A 1 - - O ( i ' ) L  A'  
where i' is the most capital-intensive good produced only in country A. 21 
The wage-rental ratio in B with trade, co ~, is analogous to (4) but with 0 
replaced by (1 - 0). 
To compare wage-rental ratios, note from (2) that autarky wage-rental 
ratios depend only on the capital-labor endowment ratios, K / L ,  since O(n) is 
the same in both countries. Thus, COo A< (D~, since A is labor abundant. 
tgDornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson (1980) use Cobb-Douglas  utility and production 
functions in part of their analysis of the Heckscher-Ohlin model with a continuum of goods. 
2USee Deardorff(1979). A single good, ic, may be produced in common. 
-'~If there is a good, ic, produced in common, then co A lies between that of eq. (4) and the 
value thai would be obtained replacing i' in (4) with ic. The argument still goes through. 
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Next note in (1) that O(n') is a weighted average of the ai from i =  1 . . . . .  n'. 
From (3) it follows that O(n') declines as n' increases. Comparing (2) and (4), 
since i '<n,  it follows that COOA<CO A. By similar reasoning for B, one can 
complete the following chain of inequalities: 
o, <coA <o B <co]. (5) 
Thus, wage--rental ratios are drawn closer together by trade in this special 
Cobb-Douglas  model, and none of the problems noted in section 3 arises. 
6. Conclusion 
I view this paper as calling attention to a problem that needs to be solved. 
The example in section 2 is not implausible, but I doubt that it is 
representative of the world. The particular pattern of substitutability in the 
example is quite asymmetric and thus, I suspect, unlikely to occur. What  we 
need is some assumption on preferences and technology together, similar in 
spirit but less restrictive than the Cobb-Douglas  assumption of section 5, 
that will rule out such an extreme result. I hope that this paper will stimulate 
others to search for such an assumption. 
After decades in which trade theory has focused primarily on properties of 
production functions, 22 it is important  that we now give equally careful 
attention to the demand side, of the economy. We have not done so before 
largely because there is little room for preferences to matter  in a two-good 
model. But as we now extend trade theory into higher dimensions, pre- 
ferences may come into their own as, if nothing else, an irritating complic- 
ation in the analysis. 
22See however Jones (1980) who has explored the roles of various assumptions about demand 
in trade theory. Also, Melvin (1969) has explored implications of a particular demand 
assumption in a Ricardian model, and Melvin (1983) has looked at taste differences within a 
country with transport costs. 
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